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Computer and network security are central issues confronting organizations and individuals. This 
paper explores the use of biology as a reference discipline that can provide meaningful insight 
and innovation in the area of network security. Specifically, we propose a framework for thinking 
about network security by examining the similarities between the defense mechanisms of a cell, 
and the security processes and methodologies of networked computer systems that defend an 
organization’s information resources. Researchers and commercial developers can use this 
framework to help spark ideas that lead to further research and development in network security. 
The framework also provides a platform for educators in teaching students about the functions of 
computer network concepts. Our analysis of defense mechanisms in biological cells showed that 
security in cells is integrated, ubiquitous, and continuous. An example illustrates how the 
framework can generate ideas for improving network security.  
Keywords:  cell biology, information security, computer network systems, cellular defense 
mechanisms, security framework, security paradigm. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Computer and network security are central issues confronting organizations and individuals [Loch 
et al., 1992; Mehta and George, 2001; Zviran and Haga, 1999]. Network security is a challenge 
as organizations and individuals become more dependent on computers for information 
processing and exchange. As the number of computers in use continues to rise and network 
complexity continues to increase, maintaining secure systems is becoming an overwhelming task. 
In modern business environments, networks are essential tools for survival. Typically, the more 
people who use a network, the more valuable the network becomes. Therefore, securing 
networks by keeping more people out may do more harm than good. At the same time, however, 
an increase in network users can result in an increase in security risk, especially because attack 
is easier than defense [Bruno, 2003]. 
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An additional challenge exists as organizations connect business networks to the Internet. While 
connecting a network to the Internet greatly increases a company’s connectivity, it also further 
increases the number of potential intruders from which the company must defend itself. The 
challenge is daunting. Security must protect the critical information of the business while allowing 
for open communication and commerce [Bruno, 2003].  
Security experts indicate that many large companies do not realize how vulnerable they are 
[Economist, 2002; Straub, 1990]. Not unlike the castles of the Middle Ages that used walls and 
moats as their primary defense, many businesses today employ firewalls as a primary barrier 
defense and thus conclude that their networks are secure. However, with the advent of the 
cannon, castle defenders realized that they needed more defense than just their wall and moat. 
Likewise, businesses today realize that a barrier defense alone is no longer enough. Even the 
best defenses must adapt or be defeated by novel technologies and tactics [Bruno, 2003]. While 
no one is suggesting an end to firewalls, there is a need to develop more efficient ways of 
securing the network. Industry is moving out of the fortress model of information security to a 
more sophisticated early-detection system that spots symptoms. However, as security is 
heightened, accessibility and operational efficiency are often sacrificed. What is needed is a 
rethinking of how to allow users easier access to data without obstructing the efficient flow of 
information because of enhanced security [Bruno, 2003]. 
The purpose of this article is to explore the use of biology as a reference discipline that can 
provide meaningful insight and innovation in network security. More specifically, we propose a 
framework for thinking about network security by examining the similarities between the defense 
mechanisms of a cell (i.e. the defense of an organism), and the security processes and 
methodologies of networked computer systems that defend an organization’s information 
resources. Such a framework and exploration can provide benefits, not only to the research 
community, but to a much broader community as well. 
Researchers can use this model as a security framework that can help spark ideas and lead to 
further research on the subject of network security. In the area of education, cell biology provides 
an interesting analogy for teaching students about numerous areas of information system 
security. Commercial developers of computer security technologies can use this framework to 
gain insights, which may lead to the development of innovative new products and/or the 
improvement of existing products. Those responsible for implementing network security in 
organizations can use this model for thinking about ways to configure and deploy their networks 
and defenses to protect their IS resources better.  
In Section II   we first introduce the framework and then provide fundamental information about 
network defense mechanisms and cellular biology. Next, we present our framework and introduce 
relevant analogies for illustration and validation (Section III). Based on the analogies, we then 
offer five central themes for cellular defense followed by an example of using the framework. 
Finally, we discuss implications (Section IV)  and provide our conclusions (Section V).  
II. THE FRAMEWORK 
USING BIOLOGY TO THINK ABOUT COMPUTING 
Using biology as an analogy for computing is not new [ e.g., Kurzweil, 2000]. In general, such 
references are informal and use different facets of the biology of the human body as analogies for 
various computing technologies, systems, or networks (e.g. the computer virus, the Internet as 
the digital nervous system). We focus specifically on the area of the defense mechanisms of a 
cell (a subset of the domain of biology) as a framework for thinking more formally about methods 
for the defense of a computer network (a subset of the domain of computer technology).  
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Figure 1 illustrates some of the more significant cellular defense mechanisms and how they relate 
to network defense mechanisms.   
 
Figure 1: The Framework 
The next two subsections provide basic information concerning computer networks and cell 
biology. These sections provide definitions and concepts that we use to draw analogies between 
cellular defenses and network defenses.  
COMPUTER NETWORKS: BACKGROUND AND BASICS 
The electronic transmission of data across global networks is essential for 21st century 
commerce. Global network integration, the merging of local and wide area networks with the 
Internet, provides many business opportunities. However, increased global connectivity gives 
outsiders greater potential to access the internal network of organizations thus putting corporate 
information resources at greater risk to malicious destruction or manipulation [Stallings, 2001]. As 
a result, modern network architectures became more complex as they defend against attacks that 
originate from the public Internet. Over the past twenty years, defenses evolved into a complex 
configuration of firewalls, intrusion detection systems, and ‘demilitarized zones’ [Frolick, 2003]. 
Figure 2 illustrates a representative network architecture.  
Some of the earliest defensive mechanisms were choke routers. These routers blocked certain 
addresses, ports, and protocols at the external point of presence of an organization’s network. As 
the frequency of cyber attacks increased during the 1990s, these routers no longer provided the 
necessary protection needed to defend against attacks.  
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Figure 2: Representative Network Architecture 
The implementation of firewalls as dedicated network devices addressed security more 
effectively. Firewalls advanced greatly and are now classified into several types, including:  
• packet-filter firewalls, which inspect every data packet entering or leaving the network,  
• application-level firewalls (often called bastion hosts), which apply security mechanisms 
to specific applications, and  
• stateful-inspection firewalls, which ‘remember’ exiting data and allow or reject packets 
based on what the firewall anticipates [Carr and Snyder, 2003].  
Other firewall varieties emerged including internal network firewalls and home or office personal 
firewalls. 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) work with firewalls to detect and prevent suspect data traffic 
from entering an organization’s network. Advanced IDSs contain sophisticated pattern analysis 
and rating systems to identify and flag suspicious and dangerous data patterns. Modem pools 
help organizations consolidate their network access points by centralizing modems, thus 
eliminating dangerous ‘back doors’ into the network. These modem pools and devices like Web 
or FTP servers can now be located in demilitarized zones (DMZs), a type of buffer zone between 
an organization’s internal network and the public Internet. DMZs allow an organization’s 
customers and suppliers access to important network-based information without them needing to 
penetrate the internal network.  
Evolving non-perimeter defensive mechanisms include anti-virus software, encryption systems, 
and virtual private networks. For example, anti-virus software now automatically updates itself 
according to a central configuration. In addition, popular antivirus packages now perform heuristic 
scanning to help identify new viruses based on their resemblance to other known viruses. 
Security configurations for network devices such as servers are a top concern. Servers must 
maintain robust passwords, up-to-date security patches, and proper administrative settings to 
deliver necessary security. Secure sockets layer is an example of a communication mechanism 
with security built into its functionality. Other popular network communication services like virtual 
private networks create a secure tunnel between multiple organizations over insecure networks, 
typically the public Internet.  
Information security threats will continue to provide challenges into the future. Organizations will 
pay increased attention to network architectures and defensive mechanisms to protect their 
information resources.  
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CELL BIOLOGY: BACKGROUND AND BASICS 
In 1858, Rudolf Virchow formulated Cell Theory. The basic premise of his theory is that the cell is 
the fundamental unit of function in all organisms. Corollaries to the theory state that the chemical 
composition of all cells is fundamentally alike; and, that all cells arise from preexisting cells 
through cell division [Farabee, 2003].  
Cells are the smallest structural units of living matter capable of functioning independently. A 
single cell can be a complete organism in itself, such as a bacterium or yeast; or cells can work 
together to become the building blocks of large multicellular organisms as complex as the human 
being [Britannica, 2003]. 
Basic Cell Structure 
Cells are enclosed by the plasma membrane, which forms a selective barrier allowing nutrients to 
enter and waste products to leave1. The plasma membrane of the cell is the primary barrier 
between the cytoplasm and the extracellular environment [Friedman, 1986]. Channels called gap 
junctions allow the passage of molecules through the plasma membranes between pairs of cells 
[Britannica, 2003]. The cytoplasm is the material that fills the inside of a cell between the plasma 
membrane (cell membrane) and the membrane of the nucleus. The interior of the cell is 
organized into many specialized compartments, or organelles, each surrounded by a separate 
membrane. [Farabee, 2003]. 
The nucleus, the largest and most prominent organelle, is enclosed by the double-membrane 
nuclear envelope. The outer membrane of the nucleus is continuous with a system of membranes 
within the cytoplasm [Barrett et al., 1986]. The nucleolus is an area of the nucleus where 
ribosomes are constructed [Farabee, 2003]. Ribosomes provide sites for protein synthesis and 
are not membrane bound.  
Another group of organelles, the mitochondria, are bounded by a double membrane that folds to 
form inward projections. The golgi apparatus (or golgi complex) is an organelle in the cytoplasm 
that packages newly synthesized proteins and carbohydrates into membrane-bound vesicles for 
transport to their final destination inside or outside of the cell [Barrett et al., 1986]. Vesicles are 
small membrane-bound spaces in most cells that transport macromolecules into and out of the 
cell and carry materials between organelles in the cell. Much larger than vesicles are the 
vacuoles. Vacuoles are membrane-bound fluid-filled spaces in cells that remove waste products 
and store ingested food [Farabee, 2003].  
In this section we briefly described fundamental network and cellular terms and functions that can 
serve as a useful reference for the remainder of this paper. In the next section, we discuss five 
categories of analogies that provide examples of the numerous similarities between computer 
network defenses and the defense mechanisms of a cell.  
III. FIVE CATEGORIES OF ANALOGIES 
Table 1 lists computer network terminologies or actions in the center column, with the analogous 
cell biology terminology or action on the right side. The left side lists the functions common to 
both computer networks and cell biology. These analogous functions are grouped into five major 
categories that exhibit similarities.  
1. BARRIER DEFENSE ANALOGY 
During the 1990s, computer network architectures evolved to contain perimeter defenses 
designed to protect internal information resources. As these perimeter architectures increase in 
                                                     
1 Plant cells also have a rigid cell wall in addition to a plasma membrane. For the purposes of this paper, 
however, we discuss cells in general without distinguishing between plant and animal cells. 
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complexity, they become more comparable to the cell’s plasma membrane. First, the cell 
membrane acts as a barrier separating the cell’s external and internal environments. Second, it 
acts as a filter allowing the entry of wanted elements while keeping out unwanted elements 
[Barrett et al., 1986]. In comparison, network perimeter architectures consist of external routers, 
intrusion detection systems and firewalls that together define the organization’s “point of 
presence” demarking the internal network from the public Internet. Like cell membranes, firewalls 
also filter out unwanted data communications while permitting wanted data to enter. Furthermore, 
analogies concerning threats exist between firewalls and plasma membranes. Any transport 
channel that circumvents the plasma membrane endangers the cell [Friedman, 1986] just as an 
unauthorized modem or a faulty firewall logic rule can endanger an entire organizational network. 
Table 1: Framework for Network Security Thinking 
  
In general, cell membranes provide three main functions:  
1. mechanical protection and a chemically buffered environment,  
2. a porous medium for the distribution of water and other small molecules, and  
3. a storage site of regulatory molecules that sense the presence of pathogenic microbes 
[Britannica, 2003].  
These three cell functions are comparable to network perimeter functionality. Computer network 
devices such as firewalls and intrusion detection systems provide:  
1. electronic protection through a buffered environment,  
2. a “porous” medium for the distribution of packets, and 
3. a regulatory listing to detect the presence of electronic intrusions.  
Variety of Membrane Channels 
Gap Junctions 
Facilitated Diffusion & Transporters (i.e. Glucose) 
Extracellular matrix signaling 
Tunneling protocols 
Secure Sockets Layer 
Virtual Private Networks 





Membrane - bound organelles, mitochondria 
Nuclear pore complex, double membrane envelope 
Internal Firewalls; 
Network DMZ (Buffer Zones) 
Internal Organization 
1.Infection Carrier 




2.System Cleansing (anti - virus s/w) 
3.System Isolation 
4.System Corruption 





Email, standard mail 
Fax, telephone 
IPv6 
Routers, routing Tables 
Internal Routing and 
Sorting 
Plasma Membrane / Plant cell wall 
Oligosaccharins: "oxidative burst“ 
Exterior Router 
Packet Filter/ Stateful Inspection 
Firewalls 
Intrusion Detection Systems 
Barrier Defense 
Cell Biology Term or Action IT Infrastructure Term or Action Function 
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The Role of Oligosaccharins 
One of the more versatile cell defense mechanisms involves oligosaccharins. Among its multiple 
roles, oligosaccharins provide a signaling function that can develop when a pathogen attacks a 
cell triggering an “oxidative burst” near the cell membrane. This burst produces hydrogen 
peroxide, superoxide, and other active oxygen types that directly attack a pathogen and can 
trigger a hardening of the cell membrane. In addition, oligosaccharins stimulate the production of 
other chemicals released outside the cell to help digest the pathogen’s wall [Saupe, 2002] in a 
type of cellular counterattack.   
A desired quality of computer network architectures is to provide an active, coordinated defense 
against attacks of an adversary rather than a passive, reactive one [Tiboni, 2002]. The multiple 
roles of oligosaccharins serve as an interesting example of what cells do to provide an ‘active 
defense.’ For example, compared to computer networks, the hardening of the cell membrane 
upon detection of a threat is comparable to switching a firewall’s logical rulebase to a more 
secure configuration upon detection of certain predetermined threat conditions, thus making the 
firewall more difficult to penetrate. 
2. BARRIER TRANSMISSION AND COMMUNICATION ANALOGY 
Today, concerns such as privacy and computer crime mandate that electronic communication 
between organizations must be secure. To meet this need, numerous secure communication 
services such as virtual private networks, secure sockets layer, tunneling protocols, advanced 
encryption techniques, and others have emerged. Similarly, a rich variety of specialized 
communication mechanisms in cells incorporate security concerns. In this subsection, we 
address four such cellular mechanisms: channels, tunnels, transporters, and signaling in the 
extracellular matrix.  
Membrane Channels 
Computer firewalls and routers manage electronic communications by opening and closing 
thousands of ports that allow or block the various types of communication flows across a network. 
At the biological level, a similar structure exists. Cells can communicate via electrical current 
flowing across the cell’s membrane. This current appears as bursts traveling through open 
channels, or holes, formed by proteins intrinsic to the membrane. If no hole is open, no significant 
current flows. These channel openings can occur spontaneously. Channels can also be opened 
by signals sent from substances such as calcium wanting to enter the cell or from changes in 
electrical potential across the membrane. Like some network firewalls that can restrict the 
passage of certain protocols or packets through certain ports, cell membrane channels permit 
passage of limited substances while other channels pass only ions with a particular positive or 
negative charge.  
Gap Junctions 
Similar to virtual private networks that provide interorganizational communications using protocols 
such as point-to-point tunneling, some cells contain tunnels called gap junctions that allow 
passage of small molecules between cells [Encyclopedia, 2003].  Gap junctions offer similar 
functionality to virtual private networks in organizations in that they provide a tunnel that enables 
protected communications between organisms or organizations.    
Facilitated Diffusion 
Contrasted with channels, facilitated diffusion is a transporter mechanism in which molecules 
create binding sites on one side of the membrane that allow molecules to bind to the membrane 
through chemical attraction. The binding site is highly specific, often fitting the atomic structure of 
only one type of molecule. When the molecule has attached to the binding site, the transporter, in 
a process not fully understood, brings the molecule through the membrane and releases it on the 
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other side [Britannica, 2003]. This mechanism allows desired molecules to diffuse the cell’s 
barrier without creating unnecessary and insecure holes.  
In a process similar to facilitated diffusion in cell membranes, computer and network firewalls 
allow desired elements to pass while blocking unwanted elements by eliminating possible entry 
channels. Firewalls, however, do not yet provide the same degree of facilitated diffusion as cells. 
Packet-filter firewalls, for instance, look at each packet entering and leaving the network based on 
predefined user rules, but often leave open holes or ports allowing potentially dangerous 
communications to pass through the firewall [Carr and Snyder, 2003]. Stateful inspection firewalls 
more closely accomplish a “facilitated diffusion” by monitoring active connections over time and 
recording information such as IP address and port numbers of all outgoing packets that request 
return packets from an external information system. Open ports remain so only if requested by an 
outgoing packet [TechTarget, 2003] thus reducing the opportunity of passing dangerous packets 
into the organization’s network.  
The Glucose Transporter 
Numerous specialized ‘facilitated diffusion’ transporters in cells help certain types of molecules 
cross the cell membrane. Some of the major types of membrane transporters include active, 
passive, primary-active, secondary-active, bulk, anion, sugar, and the glucose transporter. Since 
each transporter varies in how it passes molecules across the membrane, we will limit our 
discussion to one specific example, the glucose transporter.  
Unlike most membrane channels, the glucose transporter does not select molecules to transport 
by size. Instead, this transporter makes a conformational change and “flips” the glucose from one 
side of the membrane to the other. This flipping occurs at a rate of 1,000 molecules per second 
compared to the 1,000,000 ions per second rate of most channels. The movement of glucose 
across the membrane ceases once equilibrium is reached [Encyclopedia, 2003]. This 
conformational change and flipping of molecules provides an example for computer networks in 
that the transporter appears highly secure leaving no open holes in the membrane.  
While firewalls do provide a level of security in computer and network systems and serve a 
function similar to the cell’s outer membrane, the degree of specialization in cells appears far 
more advanced and inherently more secure. As mentioned, the glucose transporter is just one of 
many specialized cellular membrane transport mechanisms. The method that molecules use to 
cross the membrane depends on factors such as molecule size, substance, and cell need (i.e. 
glucose equilibrium). Other details remain a topic of research for cell biologists as knowledge of 
cell membranes continues to grow [Doms and Trono, 2000]. Therefore, when considering the 
multiple ways that elements cross the cell membrane, it becomes clear that cells contain a large 
repertoire of highly secure communication mechanisms that is more specialized than the 
communication mechanisms in computer network firewalls. 
Cell-to-Cell Communications via the Extracellular Matrix  
Modern electronic communications between organizations uses terms that are similar to those 
used in cellular biology.  Terms like cyberspace, extranet, and matrix computing are part of the 
information technology lexicon. In multi-cell organisms, communications that occur outside the 
cell do so in extracellular space, which consists of a gel material known as the extracellular 
matrix. The gel is composed of complex sugar molecules in a water-based solution filled with 
salts, proteins, other nutrients, and waste products. Molecules called receptors that are 
associated with the cell’s membrane provide the links from the cell to the extracellular matrix. 
These receptors interact with protein fibers that influence cell behaviors often leading to changes 
in cell shape, movement, and development. A cell can secrete or expel molecules through its 
membrane to transverse the extracellular space to another cell’s receptor. In addition to using 
receptors, cell behavior can be impacted by the passing of chemical or electrical signals across 
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extracellular space using communication mechanisms such as the gap junctions,  discussed 
previously.  
In computer networks, intrusion detection systems (IDS) attempt to identify intrusions by flagging 
suspicious communications. An IDS is typically configured as a reactive system [Sequeira, 2003] 
often identifying dangerous communications too late.  Cells, however, take a proactive approach 
to intrusion detection by deploying an array of different receptors that respond to extracellular 
signals in what may be called a signal detection system. Once detected by an associated 
receptor, an “approved” chemical signal triggers an event that changes a cell’s behavior. 
Depending on the type of cell with which it is communicating, a particular chemical signal can 
cause different cellular reactions. In one example, a receptor will trigger the opening of a 
membrane channel allowing a flow of ions into the cell which can impact the electrical properties 
of the cell’s membrane or cytoplasm [Britannica, 2003].  
Although complex, we can divide communication between cells into four basic steps:  
1. A cell sends a signal to another cell.  
2.  A cell receives the signal.  
3. The cell analyzes the request and “decides” to deny or allow the element to cross the 
membrane. 
4. If allowed, the cell changes its behavior, such as opening a channel in its membrane to 
allow the specified molecule to pass into the cell.  
Computer network defense mechanisms work in similar ways.  
1. A requestor sends a message asking for an opening in the firewall.  
2. The organization receives the communication.  
3. A network administrator analyzes the request and decides to deny or allow the 
communication to pass.  
4. If allowed, the administrator takes some action such as writing a rule to the firewall 
stating the time interlude, source internet address, and required protocol of the expected 
communication.  
Once opened, packets flow through the firewall port to the destination computer system. Here, 
cellular communications in organisms share a similar model to electronic communications in 
organizations. 
3. INTERNAL ORGANIZATION ANALOGY 
In recent years, various types of network appliances from routers to operating systems started 
integrating firewall functionality into their services. In addition to these hybrid firewall devices, 
dedicated firewalls internal to the network are appearing, especially in organizations with large 
networks. These internal firewalls can segment functional departments electronically within an 
organization or provide dedicated protection for high-value information systems or subnets. 
Internal firewalls not only provide an additional layer of protection from external intruders, but also 
protect information resources from internal threats.  Similarly, cells are compartmentalized into 
organelles. Each organelle has something of an internal firewall, an internal membrane structure 
with a distinct composition of proteins and lipids enabling a membrane to carry out its unique 
function. Like the external plasma membrane, internal organelle membranes contain transport 
proteins that facilitate chemical communication between organelles. 
The most prominent organelle, the nucleus, is a highly protected resource. A double-membrane 
envelope separated by a perinuclear space encloses the nucleus. The perinuclear space is like a 
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buffer zone or network DMZ, which forms nuclear pores through which the nucleus and 
cytoplasm communicate. Proteinaceous granules often guard these pores to help regulate the 
passage of small ions and macromolecules into the nucleus [Barrett et al., 1986]. Another 
organelle, the mitochondria, is responsible for the energy transactions necessary for cell survival. 
Like the nucleus, mitochondria also have a protective double membrane.  
The lesson that cells teach is that security is a multi-layered process. While the plasma 
membrane provides the initial protection, the organelles provide their own protection with unique 
and specialized membranes. The more valuable the organelle is to the cell, the more robust its 
membrane seems to be.  
Similarly, based on the increased use of hybrid and internal firewalls in organizational networks, it 
appears that network architectures are beginning to resemble the security architecture of cells. 
The concept of defense in depth, which stipulates that information security processes should 
penetrate much deeper into an organization than provided by perimeter defenses, is consistent 
with the multi-layered approach that cells take [Panko, 2004].  
4. INTERNAL ROUTING AND SORTING ANALOGY 
Just as organizations use numerous internal systems of communication, such as electronic mail 
and instant messaging, cells too use numerous internal delivery systems. One “full-service” 
system that facilitates cell transport and routing between organelles is endocytosis and 
exocytosis. In the process of endocytosis, cells—and some organelles—engulf material by 
forming an invagination, or inward depression, of their outer plasma membrane. The inward 
depression continues to bulge further into the cell’s cytoplasm until it finally pinches off as a 
vesicle. Later, a transport process called exocytosis discharges unwanted materials by 
performing endocytosis in reverse. Together, the endocytosis and exocytosis mechanisms serve 
as a security escort service directing and delivering material to the place it needs to go and safely 
escorting unwanted waste to the outside of the organelle or cell membrane. [Barrett et al., 1986]. 
This close-knit approach between cell security and routing represents a similar approach that is 
evident in some of the new Internet standards. The latest internet address protocol now being 
implemented, IP version 6 (IPv6), adds security and privacy values into a packet’s header field. 
IPv6 also will require the use of certain security protocols in the Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) 
framework that will enhance security capabilities at the packet level [TechTarget, 2003]. 
Improvements such as IPsec and IPv6 can make the Internet inherently more secure because 
security is designed into the core functionality of these newer protocols. The security architecture 
of the newer Internet standards is closer architecturally to the framework used in cells in that the 
newer standards now integrate security tightly into the functionality of the communication 
mechanism.   
Like organizational computer networks, an extensive routing system moves macromolecules to 
their proper functional compartment in cells. These ‘routers’ are membrane-bound systems 
devoted to keeping intracellular order by delivering newly synthesized macromolecules to their 
proper home. Although not well understood, the Golgi Apparatus handles many of these 
operations as the principal router of protein traffic in the cell [Britannica, 2003]. Other sorting 
operation details are unknown and the subject of current biological research. The internal ‘routing 
tables’ in a cell are contained in the nucleus. As the highly protected information hub of the cell, 
the nucleus provides details about the transportation of proteins into different compartments. It 
contains most of the cell’s genetic information and houses the DNA molecules, which contain the 
information a cell needs to retain its unique character.  
Internal routing and sorting in cells is not unlike that in computer networks. While such features as 
IPv6 and the inclusion of firewall functionality in routers are improving security in computer 
networks, no network mechanism yet reaches the level of encapsulated protection provided in 
cell processes such as endocytosis and exocytosis.  
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5. THE VIRUS ANALOGY 
Many similarities exist between computer viruses and biological viruses. Both domains use 
similar terminology to describe the phenomenon of a virus. In addition, the general function of a 
biological virus closely parallels that of a computer virus. 
Virus Infection and Reproduction 
In both the domains of biology and computing, viruses exist in numerous varieties, with many 
different means of creating problems for their hosts. Like biological viruses that can only 
reproduce inside host cells, most computer viruses reproduce only within another computer. Also 
like biological viruses, many computer viruses are capable of mutation and recombination. Some 
computer viruses can therefore evolve and adapt to their changing environments just as 
biological viruses are capable of doing. An example of such a computer virus is the encrypted 
virus. 
 “An encrypted virus's code begins with a decryption algorithm and continues with 
scrambled or encrypted code for the remainder of the virus. Each time it infects, it 
automatically encodes itself differently, so its code is never the same. Through 
this method, the virus tries to avoid detection by anti-virus software [McAfee, 
2003].” 
Three main types of reproductive cycles, or “life histories,” occur among animal viruses. Each of 
these three types of reproductive cycles is analogous to computer viruses.  
1. The first is the lytic cycle that occurs when a virus invades a cell, reproduces, and then 
disperses when the cell membrane breaks, or lyses. Certain computer viruses are also designed 
to enter a host system and perform some operation that results in a catastrophic, unrecoverable 
shut down or loss of data. 
2. Animal viruses called temperate viruses use a second type of reproductive cycle. These 
viruses may either go through a lytic cycle and destroy the cell they invade, or may instead enter 
a dormant phase in which the virus DNA is joined to that of the host cell and replicated with it over 
many cell generations. A host cell containing such a temperate virus is called a lysogenic cell. 
Certain external stimuli can cause a lysogenic cell’s virus DNA to enter the lytic cycle, bursting 
the cell and releasing intact viruses. An important consequence of the lysogenic relationship is 
that viruses released when a cell lyses may carry with them a portion of the host’s DNA. Host 
DNA may then be introduced into a new host cell when the virus infects another cell. This process 
is called transduction (carrying across), and it produces genetic recombination in the new host 
cell [Arms and Camp, 1987].  
Similar to the biological temperate virus, some computer viruses also enter a host system and lie 
dormant until some stimulus event brings them to action to perform whatever act they were 
designed to perform. Also, just as with the biological virus, such computer viruses can reveal, 
carry away, or at least utilize, some portion of information from the host computer as they 
replicate and move to other systems. An example of this type of computer virus is the “Trojan 
Horse” class of computer viruses. Trojan Horse viruses camouflage themselves as harmless 
pieces of software and lie dormant in the network, examining the keystrokes pressed by people 
as they use computer programs, accessing data in the system’s memory and stealing passwords 
and files [Economist, 2002]. 
3. Many animal viruses are known to be replicated and released continuously from intact host 
cells. In this third type of reproductive cycle, the virus enters its host cell by endocytosis. In the 
endocytosis process, certain proteins in the viral membrane bind to receptor proteins in the host 
cell’s plasma membrane. The host cell’s membrane eventually engulfs the virus into a vesicle 
within the cytoplasm. Once inside the cell, the virus can release its viral RNA, which directs the 
host cell to replicate the RNA genome and produce proteins for the viral capsid and envelope. 
New copies of the viral genome and capsid combine in the cytoplasm. These newly formed 
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viruses, or nucleocapsids, move to the host’s plasma membrane where the outer coating of the 
new virus and the new envelope proteins on the host’s outer wall attach to each other. The host 
cell’s plasma membrane bulges out around the forming virus particle. Eventually, the virus is fully 
surrounded by its new envelope and pinches off, or buds, from the host cell. Animal viruses that 
bud this way include influenza, measles, mumps, and rabies [Arms and Camp, 1987].  
Some computer viruses are designed to perform a function similar to the animal virus’ 
nucleocapsid approach. The computer virus enters the host system embedded or attached to an 
email or other document. Once inside the host system, the computer virus begins replicating new 
copies of itself, attaching to or “wrapping” these new virus copies in outgoing email or perhaps in 
other documents. As the email or other documents travel to another computer system, the new 
copies of the virus invade the new host system and the process is repeated. Examples of this 
type of computer virus include the Code Red, Nimda, and Klez viruses [McAfee, 2003]. 
Virus Detection and Response 
Nonspecific defense mechanisms protect all animals from diseases and viruses. Examples of 
nonspecific mechanisms in animals include skin, interferon, phagocytes, and bacterial fluids 
[Arms and Camp, 1987]. Computer networks also use nonspecific defense mechanisms. 
Examples of nonspecific defense mechanisms in computer networks include firewalls, intrusion 
detection systems (IDS), intrusion prevention systems (IPS) and antivirus software. Like 
nonspecific defense mechanisms, the immune system refers to a general system that provides 
for the defense of an organism from diseases, including viruses. Taken together, we can envision 
the group of nonspecific defense mechanisms for the network as its immune system. 
The biological immune system protects the body against viruses, as well as against other 
invaders, frequently destroying them in the bloodstream so that they never reach the cells of vital 
organs such as the brain or liver. Just as in the body, some computer viruses and/or other 
“invaders” are stopped by a firewall or other defenses and never reach a network computer. 
However, if viruses elude the body’s immune system and invade a cell, the infected cell releases 
interferons, proteins that help to protect healthy neighboring cells from the virus. Interferons 
stimulate these cells to produce substances that interfere with viral replication, a process that 
serves to isolate the neighboring cells from the virus. Intrusion detection systems and antivirus 
software are examples of systems that can serve a similar function in a computer network. When 
a virus is detected in a network, intrusion detection systems can notify administrators, send 
messages to other computers, and in some systems, isolate the infected computer from the other 
computers on the network. Similarly, when antivirus software detects a virus on a computer, it 
typically notifies the administrator and quarantines the virus. Quarantining a virus isolates the 
virus on the system and prevents it from doing any damage to the computer. The virus is held in 
quarantine until it is destroyed or otherwise removed from the system.  
FIVE CENTRAL THEMES FOR CELLULAR DEFENSE 
Five common threads or central themes emerged from this discussion, as presented in Table 2.  
Table 2. Five Central Themes of Cellular Defense Mechanisms 
1. Seamless integration of communication and security functionality 
2. Proactive approach to membrane defense and crossing 
3. High level of specialization of communication methods 
4. Standard use of internal membrane protection of high value resources 
5. Overall, security is integrated, ubiquitous, and continuous 
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1. Security functionality is highly integrated into cellular communication mechanisms.  
That is, the security is not separate from the communication mechanism, but is rather an integral 
part of the communication system itself. In general, we do not see dedicated security 
mechanisms in cells. What we do see is security built directly into the various communication 
mechanisms. Examples of such integration in cellular communication systems include facilitated 
diffusion, membrane channels, and the numerous transporters, all of which are also inherently 
secure mechanisms.  
2. Cells take a proactive approach to identification and passage of items through the outer cell 
membrane.  
Instead of taking the approach of identifying unwanted elements, which is the common method 
with intrusion detection systems in computer networks, cells take an opposite approach. By 
focusing on the ‘friendly’ chemical or electrical signals provided by a visitor at the outer wall of the 
cell membrane, cells provide an active defense by identifying desired elements prior to allowing 
their passage through the external membrane2.  
3. Cells developed a rich variety of highly specialized mechanisms for moving molecules across 
or through the outer membrane.  
There appears to be a tailored mechanism for each type of molecule. In fact, there are numerous 
other transporters and membrane channels, with each designed for specific types or groups of 
molecules.  
4. Cells make liberal use of internal membranes to protect their more valuable assets or 
resources.  
Mitochondria, vesicles, and the nucleus, for example, all contain their own protective 
membrane—or multiple membranes—in addition to the cell’s outer membrane.  
When considering the full range of mechanisms that inherently provide cellular security, we 
conclude that cells maintain a high-security orientation. Defensive functionality is present in 
mechanisms at the cell wall, within organelles, during internal routing, and throughout the entire 
cell. In addition, the defensive mechanisms of a cell are not intermittently active, but rather are 
continuously active, or always on.  
5. The  overall central theme is that cell security is integrated, ubiquitous, and continuous.  
That is, in biological cells, security is a part of everything, security is everywhere, and security is 
always functioning. These five themes suggest general implications for network security design, 
which we discuss in Section V.  
SUMMARY OF THE ANALOGIES 
The five categories of analogies presented in the previous sections include:  
• The Barrier Defense Analogy,  
• The Barrier Transmission and Communication Analogy,  
• The Internal Organization Analogy,  
• The Internal Routing and Sorting Analogy, and  
                                                     
2 Cells also respond to threats from unwanted elements like dangerous pathogens, but the primary focus 
seems to be on the proactive identification of friendly or desired elements. 
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• The Virus Analogy.  
Each of the analogies in these categories suggests similarities between biological cellular 
functions that defend the organism as compared to computer network systems that defend the 
organization. However, the value of formally exploring such similarities comes from the 
stimulation of ones thinking, which helps generate ideas and insights, which in turn can lead to 
network security improvements. In the next section, we offer two examples of how we used the 
framework to spark ideas for improving computer network security. 
IV. USING THE FRAMEWORK 
The first idea came from two processes in biology. The first process is one of the methods the cell 
membrane uses to move larger molecules into and out of a cell (i.e. endocytosis and exocytosis). 
The second process is the nucleocapsid approach that some viruses use for replication. These 
two processes lead to our first network security idea: that data traveling within a computer 
network should not move through security, and/or from security to security, but rather, the 
security should move with the data. That is, data should be “wrapped” in the security and the 
security would move with the data as the data moves through the network.  
A second idea came from the active defense mechanisms in cells: first, the oligosaccharins, 
which signal the ‘oxidative burst’ at the cell membrane as an offensive counter attack; and 
second, the reaction of a cell invaded by a virus, that when dying, releases interferons into the 
system prior to its death to warn and protect other cells. Based on these two active defense 
mechanisms, each individual computing system should have the capability of identifying an 
attacker, sounding a system-wide alarm, and sending vital information concerning the attacker to 
all other systems within the network. Using the vital information concerning the attacker, other 
systems would release ‘hunter-killer’ agents, that would scour the entire network to ‘search-and-
destroy’ the previously hidden or unidentifiable attackers.  
An additional layer of security could provide for an emergency response when an attacker 
immediately and catastrophically eliminates an individual system. Under this circumstance, the 
infected system would not be able to send out a warning or other information to allow identifying 
of its attacker. However, in such a case, a network monitoring system would detect the 
elimination of the attacked system and automatically raise the security level of the entire network, 
effectively insulating each individual system until an investigation could reveal the problem with 
the ‘dead’ system.  
An extension of the second idea would include a full-time active defense mechanism. In a cell’s 
external environment, the cell receives full-time protection from the body’s immune system. Many 
potential threats are eliminated before they can attack an individual cell. In a similar manner, an 
extension of the second idea proposes intelligent ‘hunter-killer’ agents that would continually 
roam the network in search of intruders. Anytime a new threat was identified, all agents would 
have their memories or knowledge bases updated to add to their list of known intruders. Each 
agent would also have the capability of using its knowledge base to identify potential attackers 
and make a temporary ‘arrest.’ Temporary detainment allows the suspect to be isolated for a 
quick ‘background-check’ before facing either release back into the network or permanent 
deletion. Regular communication would be maintained among all of the agents so that each such 
encounter would also update the other active agents in the system.  
V. IMPLICATIONS 
GENERAL IMPLICATIONS FOR USING THE FRAMEWORK 
We believe that our framework and exploration can provide benefits, not only to the research 
community, but to a much broader community as well. In the area of education, cell biology and 
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the framework presented in this article can provide interesting analogies for teaching students 
about the functions of firewalls, intrusion detection systems, exterior/interior routers, proxy 
servers, network DMZs, access control lists, anti-virus software, and numerous other areas of 
information system security. Since biology is part of a basic high school curriculum, biological 
analogies provide a natural reinforcement and cross-training tool when discussing computer 
technologies in the classroom. In addition, because analogies between computing and biology 
have been used for some time (e.g. computer viruses, computer memory, neural networks) using 
such relationships in teaching are natural extensions of analogies that many students already 
know something about. 
In addition to being useful within education, we also feel the framework can be helpful to 
practitioners and consultants in a number of different ways. For example, those who are 
responsible for implementing network security in organizations can use this model for thinking 
about ways to configure and deploy their networks and its defenses to protect their IS resources. 
Commercial developers of information security technologies can use this framework in thinking 
about and developing innovative new products and improvements to existing products.  
The framework can be used as a guide to spark ideas and lead to new research on network 
security. However, while we feel there can be significant value in using the framework in 
research, we did not find a single reference to such an approach in the extant MIS literature. In 
our search of the literature, we found only two references to any similar approach and these were 
both in Computer Science. Consider the value of an approach similar to our framework as quoted 
in a reference from MIT’s Journal of Evolutionary Computation. Here the authors describe the use 
of the biological immune system as a basis for designing artificial systems:  
We believe that the biological immune system provides a compelling example of 
a massively-parallel, adaptive, information-processing system, which we can 
study for the purpose of designing better artificial systems. The biological 
immune system is compelling because it exhibits many properties that we would 
like to incorporate into artificial systems: it is diverse, distributed, error tolerant, 
dynamic, self-monitoring (or self-aware), and adaptable. These properties give 
the biological immune system certain key characteristics that most artificial 
systems today lack: robustness, adaptivity, and autonomy [Hofmeyr and Forrest, 
2000, pg. 443].  
GENERAL IMPLICATIONS FOR NETWORK SECURITY DESIGN 
The five central themes discussed in Table 2 suggest specific implications for computer network 
design, as summarized in Table 3.   
Table 3. Implications of the Five Central Themes for Network Security Design 
FIVE CENTRAL THEMES: IMPLICATIONS FOR NETWORK DESIGN: 
Integration of communications and security Integrated or embedded security functionality 
Proactive membrane defense and crossing Focus on active detection of friendly 
communications 
Specialization of communication methods Specific and specialized communication 
mechanism 
Internal protection of valued resources Widespread use of internal firewalls 
Security is integrated, ubiquitous, and 
continuous 
Security is integrated, ubiquitous, and 
continuous 
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1. We should see fewer security-dedicated processes and more communication processes with 
embedded or integrated security functionality (e.g. virtual private networks).  
2. Instead of focusing on the detection of unwanted or dangerous data communications, firewalls 
and intrusion detection systems should evolve to focus primarily on actively detecting desired or 
‘friendly’ communications.  
3. We should see a proliferation of specialized network communication processes designed 
specifically for the various types or groups of network transmissions.  
4. Within organizational networks, we should see an increase in the use of internal firewalls 
providing increased protection for the organization’s important assets or resources.  
5. Finally, as an overarching network design theme, we should expect to see a proliferation of 
network security mechanisms and devices based on security that is integrated, ubiquitous, and 
continuous.  
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
The growing need and projected demand for better network security coupled with a general 
absence of related articles in MIS academic journals suggests that the area of computer network 
security is a fruitful subject for scholarly research attention. More specifically, within the domain of 
MIS, the area of computer network security offers a topic that is both appropriate to the MIS 
discipline’s core properties [Benbasat and Zmud, 2003] and ready for innovative study, research, 
and exploration.  
The general approach represented in our framework is described in the following quote: 
The latest thinking draws on lessons learned from the body's immune system. 
Besides being one of the wonders of biology, the immune system is also a 
marvel of parallel and distributed computing--and one that offers insight into how 
networks can be made to resist attacks naturally [Economist, 2002, pg. 32]. 
 
The key point of this “latest thinking” approach is that the biology-computer analogy can offer 
insights that may otherwise be overlooked. That is, as networks continue to grow in their 
connectivity, number of users, and overall complexity, the more the design of network security 
should perhaps follow the example of the cell—that network security should also be integrated, 
ubiquitous, and continuous.  
In summary, the framework presented in this paper and its approach to using cellular biology as a 
reference for thinking about network security is a timely idea that can offer important implications 
within a broad community. It is our belief that as computing technology continues to expand its 
role as an enabling necessity in organizations, network security will also continue to grow in its 
need for new ideas and creative solutions for securing the information and resources of the 
modern business. We extend a call to researchers in MIS and related domains to become a part 
of the creative process of developing insightful solutions in response to the growing challenge of 
providing innovative and viable network security.  
Editor’s Note: This article was received on November 18, 2003 and was published on December 31, 2003 
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DMZ  Demilitarized Zone 
DNA  Deoxyribonucleic acid 
FTP  File Transfer Protocol 
IDS  Intrusion detection systems  
IP              Internet Protocol 
IPS   Intrusion prevention systems  
IPsec          Internet Protocol Security  
IPv6  Internet Protocol version 6 
RNA  Ribonucleic acid  
 
 
ABOUT THE AUTHORS  
Kenneth J. Knapp is a doctoral candidate in Management Information Systems at Auburn 
University.  He is an active duty Lieutenant Colonel (select) in the United States Air Force 
specializing in information management and security.  He has a B.S. in Computer Science from 
DeSales University and an MBA from Auburn University.  He served as Assistant Professor and 
Director of Curriculum at the United States Air Force Academy’s Department of Management 
from 2001 to 2002.  He is a member of AIS and the Armed Forces Communications and 
Electronics Association.  
R. Frank Morris, Jr. is a Ph.D. student in Management Information Systems at Auburn 
University. His research interests include computer and network security, information systems 
strategy, computer/technology acceptance and use, and information systems value and success. 
He holds a bachelor’s degree in Aerospace Engineering from Georgia Institute of Technology and 
an MBA from Georgia Southern University. Mr. Morris has more than twenty years of experience 
working in private industry.  
R. Kelly Rainer, Jr. is George Phillips Privett Professor of Management Information Systems at 
Auburn University.  He is co-author, with Efraim Turban and Richard Potter, of Introduction to 
Information Technology (3rd edition), Wiley and Sons, 2004. 
Terry Anthony Byrd is Professor of Management Information Systems at Auburn University, 
Auburn, Alabama. He holds a B.S. in Electrical Engineering from the University of Massachusetts 
at Amherst and a Ph.D. in Management Information Systems from the University of South 
Carolina.  His research appears in the Journal of Management Information Systems, MIS 
Communications of the Association for Information Systems (Volume12, 2003) 701-719                           719 
The Defense Mechanisms of Biological Cells: A Framework for Network Security Thinking by K. Knapp,      
F. Morris, R.K. Rainer, Jr., and T.A. Byrd 
Quarterly, Decision Sciences, OMEGA, Interfaces, and other leading journals. His current 
research interests include the strategic management of information technology, information 
technology architecture and infrastructure, and information technology integration. 
Copyright © 2003 by the Association for Information Systems. Permission to make digital or hard 
copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that 
copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this 
notice and full citation on the first page. Copyright for components of this work owned by others 
than the Association for Information Systems must be honored. Abstracting with credit is 
permitted. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers, or to redistribute to lists requires 
prior specific permission and/or fee. Request permission to publish from: AIS Administrative 







                                           ISSN: 1529-3181 
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF 
Paul Gray 
Claremont Graduate University 
AIS SENIOR  EDITORIAL BOARD 
Cynthia Beath 
Vice President Publications  
University of Texas at Austin  
Paul Gray                                 
Editor, CAIS                                
Claremont Graduate University 
Sirkka Jarvenpaa 
Editor, JAIS 
University of Texas at Austin 
Edward A. Stohr 
Editor-at-Large 
Stevens Inst. of Technology 
Blake Ives                                
Editor, Electronic Publications  
University of Houston 
Reagan Ramsower 
Editor, ISWorld Net 
Baylor University 
CAIS ADVISORY BOARD   
Gordon Davis 
University of Minnesota 
 Ken Kraemer 
Univ. of California at Irvine 
Richard Mason 
Southern Methodist University 
Jay Nunamaker                    
University of Arizona 
Henk Sol 
Delft  University 
Ralph Sprague 
University of Hawaii 
CAIS SENIOR EDITORS  
Steve Alter 







Stevens Institute of 
Technology 
CAIS EDITORIAL BOARD    
Tung Bui 
University of Hawaii 
 
H. Michael Chung  
California State Univ.  
Candace Deans 
University of Richmond 
Donna Dufner 
U.of Nebraska -Omaha 
Omar El Sawy  
University of Southern 
California 
Ali Farhoomand 





Queens University, Canada 
Robert L.  Glass 
Computing Trends 
Sy Goodman  
Georgia Institute of 
Technology 
Joze Gricar 
University of Maribor 
 
Ruth Guthrie 
California State Univ.  
Juhani Iivari 
University of Oulu 
Munir Mandviwalla  
Temple University 
M.Lynne Markus  
Bentley College 
Don McCubbrey  
University of Denver 
Michael Myers 
University of Auckland,  
Seev Neumann                  
Tel Aviv University, Israel 
Hung Kook Park  
Sangmyung University,  
Dan Power  
University of Northern Iowa 
Nicolau Reinhardt  
University of Sao Paulo,  
Maung Sein  
Agder University College,  
Carol Saunders 
University of Central 
Florida 
Peter Seddon  
University of Melbourne 
Australia 
Doug Vogel  
City University of Hong 
Kong,  
Hugh Watson  
University of Georgia 
Rolf Wigand  




ADMINISTRATIVE PERSONNEL                                                                              
Eph McLean  
AIS, Executive Director 
Georgia State University 
Samantha Spears 
Subscriptions Manager 
Georgia State University 
Reagan Ramsower 
Publisher, CAIS 
Baylor University 
 
